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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the other two it was granted. This does not mean that the Act has
not been given liberal interpretation or that the potentialities of the
procedure as an alternative remedy9 have been overlooked. The
denials were based on plaintiff's failure to present an adversary dis-
pute on a question of legal import in connection with his application
for a declaratory judgment to settle his racial status ;1o on the belief
that probate under provisions of Section 4163 of the consolidated
statutes ought still to be the exclusive procedure to determine the
validity of a will ;" and on the fact that plaintiff's complaint stated
a cause of action which had already accrued under an insurance pol-
icy, and not a prayer for anticipatory relief. 12 The two instances in
which the Court upheld declaratory judgments illustrate the value
of the new remedy. In one a deed was construed in advance of any
breach of covenants and the rights of the parties set forth.18 In the
other, a recent and most important case, the Court determined the
rights of the city, the traction company, and the public under a street-
car franchise from the city of Raleigh. 14
JOE EAGLES.
Evidence-Trial Judge's Power of Comment.
In Quercia v. United States' the court charged the jury that
defendant had wiped his hands during his testimony and that such a
mannerism was almost always an indication of lying, and further,
that he thought everything the defendant said was a lie. Held:
Prejudical error.
Under the common law, trial judges had the power of comment-
ing and expressing their opinion upon the evidence.2 This rule is
still followed in English courts3 and in the federal courts of the
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §628 ("Courts of record within their
-respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed").
. In Re George C. Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932). See
Miller v. Currie, 242 N. W. 570 (Wis. 1932) (a declaratory judgment as to
plaintiff's legitimacy is possible under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act.) Commented upon (1932) 46 HAR. L. REv. 336.
' Poore v. Poore, 201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931).
" Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. of Cincinnati, 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. .
38 (1932).
'Walker v. Phelps, 202 N. C. 344, 162 S. E. 727 (1932)."' Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Isley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933).
177 L. ed. 996 (1933).
'Capitol Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. ed. 873
(1899) ; HALE, HisTORy OF THE. CoMmox LAW (1792) 291; 16 C. J. 939 §2308b.
"Jefferson v. Paskell, 1 K. B. 57 (1916).
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United States, in both dvil and criminal cases.4  This, honever, is
not an unrestricted power of comment. It is subject to the general,
flexible limitation typically defined as follows: "the line of demarca-
tion between what a court may say to the jury * ** * * in expressing
his opinion on the facts, and what he may not say, is to be drawn
between mere expression of opinion not partaking of such argu-
mentative nature as to amount to advocacy, leaving to the jury abso-
lute freedom to determine the facts; and such discussion as amounts
to an argument and makes the court in fact an advocate against the
defendant." 5 This vague rule permits of widely divergent results.0
For example, in a criminal case the court's charge that "in my opin-
ion the defendant is a liar" was held to be prejudical. 7 On the other
hand a charge that the government's witnesses, who had directly
contradicted the defendant, "were telling the truth" was held not to
exceed the power of comment.8 In practically all cases, the trial
judge's comment is held not to be prejudicial if the judge qualifies his
remarks by making it clear to the jury that what he says is not bind-
ing upon them and that the facts are subject to their consideration
and decision,9 unless -his comment is obviously unfair and argu-
mentative, 10 such as "you are not to be hoodwinked or bamboozled
by anybody * * * if a witness testifies that down the street he saw
an elephant climb a telephone pole, you are not bound to believe it is
a fact, even though he shows you the pole."1" Under the above rule,
"Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148, 12 Sup. Ct. 171, 35 L. ed. 968
(1891Y; United States v. Phila., Reading R. Co., 123 U. S. 113, 8 Sup. Ct. 77,
31 L. ed. 138 (1887); CooLEY, PRINCIPLES OP CONSTITunONAL LAW (3d ed.
1898) 265.
'Cook v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Kolknman v.
People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575, 579 (1931).
"Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 14 Sup. Ct. 144, 37 L. ed. 1137
(1893); Allison v. United States, 160 U. S. 203, 16 Sup. Ct. 252, 40 L. ed. 395
(1895); cf. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 36, 65
L. ed. 185 (1920) ; Shea v. United States, 251 Fed. 440 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
' Malaga v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
'Tuckermann v. United States, 291 Fed. 958 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
'Buchanan v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Weider-
man v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Tuckermann v.
United States, supra note 8, at 965.
"Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 626, 14 Sup. Ct. 919, 38 L. ed. 841
(1894) (trial judge voiced his indignation in a sarcastic charge ridiculing the
defense) ; Mullen v. United States, 106 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901) (the court
charged "that if these defendants desired or anybody desired to have colored
men deprived of the right to vote, it would be in such a precinct as this and
it is not improbable that just such men as these defendants would be chosen
to carry that object into execution") ; Parker v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 710
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
Carney v. United States, 295 Fed. 606 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
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comment is allowed only upon the evidence in the case12 and it should
be given so as not to mislead the jury in ultimately deciding con-
troverted questions of fact.' 8
The trends, if any, in respect to the use of the above rule seem
to be: (1) that greater emphasis is allowed in the federal courts in
commenting on the evidence;14 and (2) that some distinction is
drawn in a few jurisdictions between the application of the rule in
criminal and in civil cases, some states limiting the extent of com-
ment in criminal cases.15 Federal courts, however, as regards the
comment rule, are not bound by the practice in the jurisdictions in
which they are sitting.'1
Although only twelve states follow the practice of the English
and federal courts,17 it would seem that such is the better policy
since it does not deprive the jury of the experience and knowledge
of the trial judge. Those who oppose this policy on the ground that
he will usurp the jury's function have little to fear in view of the
'Mullen v. United States, supra note 10, at 895; O'Shaughnessy et al. v.
United Stales, 17 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); City of Minneapolis v.
Canterbury, 122 Minn. 301, 142 N. W. 812 (1913).
"Rudd v. United States, 173 Fed. 912, 97 C. C. A. 462 (1909) ; State v.
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 Pac. 987 (1908) ; Seviour v. Rutland R. Co., 88 Vt.
107, 91 Atl. 1039 (1914).
" United States v. Phila., Reading R. Co., supra note 4, at 139; Weiderman
v. United States, supra note 9, at 746; cf. State v. Greene, supra note 13, at
989; Bradley v. Gorham, 77 Conn. 211, 58 Atl. 698 (1904).
People v. Lee, 2 Utah 441 (1878) ; State .v. Dolliver, 150 Minn. 155, 184
N. W. 848 (1921); Ames v. Cannon River Co., 27 Minn. 245, 6 N . W. 787
(1880).
' Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 23 L. ed. 286 (1875) (The supreme court
in commenting upon the act of Congress, June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 197 (1872), 28
U. S. C. A. 724 (1928)) -which states that the practice of the circuit and district
courts shall conform to that of the state courts in which such circuit or dis-
trict court is held, says-"The identity reqt.ired is to be in practice, pleadings
and forms and modes of proceeding. The personal conduct and administration
of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions is in our judgment,
neither practice, pleading, nor a form nor mode of proceeding within the
meaning of those terms as found in the context.")
' Colorado-Kolkman v. People, supra note 5.
Connecticut-State v. Cianeflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 Atl. 349 (1923).
Michigan-People v. Burlingame, 257 Mich. 252, 241 N. W. 253 (1932);
MicH. ComP. LAWS (1929) §17322.
Minnesota-Ames v. Cannon River Co., supra note 15.
New Hampshire-Flanders v. Colby, 28 N. H. 34 (1853).
New Jersey-Merklinger v. Lambert, 76 N. J. L. 806, 72 At. 119 (1909).
New York-Hurlbutt v. Hurlbutt, 128 N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651 (1891).
Ohio-Sandoffsky v. State, 29 Ohio App. 419, 163 N. E. 634 (1928).
Pennsylvania-Johnston v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 54 (1877).
Rhode Island-Smith v. Rhode Island Co.. 39 R. I. 146, 98 Atl. 1 (1916).
Utah-People v. Lee, supra note 15.
Vermont-Sawyer v. Phaley, 33 Vt. 69 (1860).
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tendency on the part of appellate courts to rigidly supervise hi.
exercise of discretion.' 8
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.
Insurance-Construction of "Violation of Law"
Exception in Policy.
An action was brought on a life insurance policy which provided
that double indemnity should not be payable if death resulted from
violation of law. Insured was killed when he ran 'his car into a cul-
vert on the left side of the highway. The court below instructed the
jury that if insured "inadvertently and involuntarily drove his car
upon the left hand side of the road, 'he may have been guilty of
negligence, but he was not guilty of violation of law in so doing."
Held, that this instruction was erroneous.'
Some courts in construing such conditions have held that there
must be a violation of the criminal law.2  Generally, this clause in-
cludes the commission of a misdemeanor,3 but where the associated
exceptions impute the commission of a felony, the courts hold, in
accordance with the maxim noscitur a sociis, that the exception ex-
tends only to a violation of law which amounts to a felony.4 The
resulting death may be accidental 5 or caused by the intentional act of
another.0 However, in order that the insurer may be discharged the
' Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 327, 40 L. ed. 474, 480
(1896) and cases cited.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Grimsley, 168 S. E. 329 (Va. 1933).
'Ragan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 209 Iowa 1075, 229 N. W. 702
(1930) (riding in box car held no crime such as to avoid accident policy) ; see
Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 308, 317 (1866) (attempt-
ing to forcefully take 'personal property from debtor).
Some courts say it need not necessarily be a violation of the criminal law.
Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478. 49 Am. Rep. 469 (1884). In
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531, 22 L. ed. 155 (1873) where insured
was killed in horse race, the court said, "It was against the general species of
danger attending nearly all infractions of law that the exception was directed."
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, supra note 2 (horse-racing made a mis-
demeanor); Wolff v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App, 236 (1878).
Coara: Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Quarles, 23 Ga. App. 104, 97
S. E. 557 (1918)."
"Harper's Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506 (1854) ("if insured
should die in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known
violation of any law of this state") ; cf. Brown v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 83
Mo. App. 633 (1900) (all the associated exceptions were not felonies).
Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614, 48 Am. Rep. 658 (1884).
0 Osborne v. People's Benev. Industrial Life Ins. Co. of La., 19 La. App.
667, 139 So. 733 (1932).
In some cases the test has been whether the insured was the aggressor.
Woodmen of the World v. Walters, 124 Ky. 663, 99 S. W. 930 (1907) ; Payne
